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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WOODEY B. SEARLE and VONETTA )
SEARLE, RANDY B. SEARLE and
)
VICKIE SEARLE, RANCE W. SEARLE)
and GAIL SEARLE, RHETT A.
)
SEARLE and TONY SEARLE,
)

)

Plaintiffs-Appellants, )

)

)

v.

LONNIE JOHNSON and the
HUMANE SOCIETY OF UTAH,

No. 17349

)

)

)
)
Defendants-Respondents.)

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT AND NATURE OF CASE
Appellants brought this action seeking compensation for
damages caused to Appellants' businesses by the intentional,
false and malicious statements and actions of the Defendants
when the Defendants launched a campaign to keep tourists
from patronizing businesses in Vernal, Utah, in an unlawful
attempt to force certain actions by local government officials.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
The District Court ruled, before trial, by way of
summary judgment, that Defendants' deliberate efforts to
destroy Plaintiffs' businesses were absolutely privileged
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because of the right to petition protection of the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in that
such attacks were motivated by Defendants' hope that Plaintiffs and others so attacked would be forced to demand
certain concessions desired by Defendants of the public
officials of the community where Plaintiffs reside.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have this Court reverse the summary
judgment of the trial court and remand the case for trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1975 and 1976, Defendant The Humane Society of Utah
of Salt Lake City, an affiliate of the national organization, and its director, Defendant Lonnie Johnson, a resident
of Salt Lake City, attempted to convince the elected officials in Uintah County, Utah and Vernal City to make extensive changes in the animal control facility owned by
those entities.

Defendants also approached the Uintah

County Attorney and the Attorney General of the State of
Utah seeking criminal prosecution of the political entities,
the Vernal City Councilmen and the Uintah County Commissioners. (R. 132-137 with attached exhibits)

The political

entities informed the Defendants that all the changes requested would not be made at that particular time, and that
part of the reasons given for the desired changes were based
on false information.

The Uintah County Attorney and the
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Attorney General's office found no violation of the laws of
the State of Utah and refused to bring any legal action.
When the Defendants failed to obtain the changes they desired
in the animal control facility, the Defendants expressly and
openly set out to destroy selected businesses in Vernal by
keeping tourists from visiting Eastern Utah, in particular,
Dinosaur land in Vernal, Utah.

The

Defendants'~

theory was

that if enough economic damage could be caused to certain
businesses, the owners of those businesses would be forced
to join with Defendants in extracting from City and County
government officials concessions which the Defendants had
been unable to obtain through the usual processes of influencing government by reason or persuasion and through
court action. (R. 191-192, 228)

The Defendants launched a

campaign on radio and television as well as newspapers and
magazines using both local and national media.

A large

billboard was also placed along the freeway in Salt Lake
City, Utah. (R. 107, 132-136)

Defendants' target was

tourist businesses and their campaign embodied statements
which Defendants knew were untrue but which would attract
great attention and result in national recognition for
Defendants. (R. 132, 228, 230)
The Plaintiffs, ranchers in Uintah County, own a
travel agency, restaurant, motel and gift shop in Vernal,
Utah.

The Plaintiffs are not involved in or connected with
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the subject of the controversy between the Defendants and
City and County officials, nor do they have any special
relationship or influence with those officials.

Plaintiffs

do spend money advertising in the same markets Defendants
chose to enter with its false and misleading campaign against
Plaintiffs.

As a result of the Defendants' actions, the

Plaintiffs' businesses suffered a large reduction in tourist
trade and income starting in 1976.

To stop the actions

taken by Defendants, the Plaintiffs filed this action seeking
injunctive relief and to recover those losses. (R. 6-10)

Soon

after the complaint was filed, the Defendants, realizing the
wrongfulness of their actions, removed the billboard and
ceased their media attack.

Plaintiffs now seek to be com-

pensated for their __losses.
The Plaintiffs' complaint includes the following allegations:
Paragraph No. 8, Third Amended Complaint:
Defendants, Lonnie Johnson and The Humane Society
of Utah, have maliciously and unlawfully published
false and misleading statements about and concerning Vernal, Utah, Uintah County, Utah, and Dinosaurland in eastern Utah, for the purpose and with the
intent that such adverse publicity will keep
tourists and other persons away from Vernal, Utah,
and injure Plaintiffs' tourist business and the
tourist business of other persons in Dinosaurland.
Paragraph No. 9, Third Amended Complaint:
The malicious, false and misleading statements
published by the Defendants included a campaign
conducted by the Defendants commencing in the

-4-
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month of February, 1976, wherein the Defendants
intentionally attempted to dissuade tourists and
other persons from traveling to Dinosaurland where
such persons would use the tourist facilities and
services operated by Plaintiffs.
Paragraph No. 13, Third Amended Complaint:
Defendants, by publication of the statements referred to above and their conducting the abovereferred. .to_ campaign .to .keep tourists_ out of
Dinosaurland, have without justification intentionally inflicted harm to Plaintiffs' businesses.
Paragraph No. 14, Third Amended Complaint:
The acts performed by the Defendants constitute
unjustified intentional infliction of harm to
Plaintiffs' businesses, interference::with prospective advantage in Plaintiffs' businesses,
injurious falsehood affecting Plaintiffs' businesses, interference with patronage of Plaintiffs'
businesses and unlawful restraint of trade, and
Plaintiffs are entitled to recover for the damages
caused to them thereby.
Paragraph No. 16, Third Amended Complaint;
Defendants' statements, actions .and motives are
willful, malicious, intentional and false.
Paragraph No. 17, Third Amended Complaint:
The statements made by Defendants were made by
Defendants knowing said statements were false or
in reckless disregard of the truth. (R. 465)
Upon the filing of Plaintiffs' complaint, Defendants
irrnnediately removed the case from the Fourth District Court
of Utah to the Federal District Court for Utah.

One of the

arguments made by Defendants in support of the removal was

-5-
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that a state court injunction and damages were being sought
"for conduct fully protected by the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution." (R. 25, 69)

Plaintiffs moved

the Federal District Court to remand the case to the Fourth
Judicial District Court of Utah, arguing that the acts
performed by Defendants were cormnon torts and that only
after the Utah courts define those torts and prescribe their
elements will it be known whether a federal or Constitutional issue exists.

Judge Willis W. Ritter remanded the

case to the Utah District Court and ordered that:
this case was improperly removed to this Court in
that the complaint herein does not present a claim
or right arising under the Constitution, treaties
or laws of the United States. (R. 61, 63)
The Defendants then filed an action for declaratory and
injunctive relief in the United States District Court for
the District of Utah, asserting that this action in the
State Court should be enjoined since the acts of Defendants
complained of in Plaintiffs' complaint were privileged under
the First Amendment.

On September 6, 1976, Judge Ritter

dismissed that action on the pleadings, once again holding
that the complaint alleged a cormnon law tort.(R. 205)
Defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment in
this case claiming the actions of Defendants complained
about were privileged under the First Amendment.

Both

parties briefed the issues fully and on December 21, 1977,
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Judge Allen B. Sorensen denied that motion. (R. 245)
The case having been set for trial before the Honorable
David Sam, the Defendants, once again by a motion for summary judgment, raised the defense that their actions were
absolutely privileged by the First Amendment right to petition.

On July 29, 1980, Judge Sam granted the Defendants'

motion for summary judgment ruling that even if all the
allegations in the Plaintiffs' complaint were considered to
be true, the Defendants' actions were absolutely privileged
by the First Amendment right to petition. (R. 1)

(It

should be noted that the trial judge signed two orders
granting the motion for summary judgment. (R. 1, 4)

The

order prepared by Defendants' counsel (R.4) was prepared
first and furnished to the Court.

A telephone conference

call was held and it was agreed by the Court and counsel
that the order prepared by Plaintiffs' counsel (R. l) set
forth more clearly the trial court's ruling and should be
the order signed and filed by the judge.

The trial judge

erroneously signed and filed both orders granting Defendants'
Motion For Summary Judgment.)

It is from that summary

judgment that Defendants appeal.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.

PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT ALLEGES FACTS WHICH,
WHEN PROVEN AT TRIAL, CONSTITUTE A CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH
PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE ENTITLING
THEM TO COMPENSATION FOR THEIR DAMAGES.

It has long been recognized that every person has the
right to engage in lawful business.

Freedom of enterprise

is one of the cornerstones of our democratic society.

The

protection of one's means of livelihood is just as important
as the protection of the physical integrity of his personal
property.

The success or failure of a person's business

often depends upon the reputation the business enjoys with
potential customers.

Thus, terms like reputation, good will

and respect are very important and large amounts of money
are spent to establish them.
and easy to destroy.

Good will is hard to come by

See, Green, et al., Torts, 835, 866

(1968).
Because of the value of good will and the right to
pursue a business free from unjustified interference, the
common law has developed ways of protecting business interests.

At a very early date, it was recognized that a

party has a right to pursue a business free from unjustified
interference.

See, Garrett v. Taylor, 79 Eng. Rep. 485,

involving threats of mayhem and vexatious suits against
customers and workmen; and, Tarleton v. McGawley, 170 Eng.
Rep. 153 (1793) where the defendant fired upon African
natives with whom the plaintiff was about to trade.

-8-
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The

American courts slowly followed the English courts and began
to recognize the right to be free from interference in
economic dealings. The case of Evenson v. Spauling, 150 F.

517 (1907), is a good example.

In that case, plaintiff had

a wagon company and his salesmen would travel throughout the
State of Washington selling wagons.

Wherever the salesmen

would go, they were followed by two or three of defendant's
agents.

When the salesmen engaged in conversations with

potential customers, defendant's agents would interrupt and
advise the customers not to buy, and to prevent trouble,
1

many customers refused to buy.

The court, in sustaining an

injunction prohibiting defendant from following plaintiff's
salesmen, said:
While the appellees (plaintiffs) have no right to
protection against competition, they have the
right to protection against wanton and malicious
interference and annoyance.
The case of Brennan v. United Hatters of North America,

65 A. 165 (1906), was one of the first cases to recognize
liability for tortious interference with prospective ecod

nomic advantage.
The New Jersey Supreme Court said:
[I]n a civilized community which recognizes the
right of private property among its institutions,
the notion is intolerable that a man should be
protected by the law in the enjoyment of property
once it is acquired, but left unprotected by the
law is his effort to acquire it ...
It seems logical that as a state recognizes the right to be
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free from interference with contracts entered into, the
state also ought to give some protection for future contractual relations.
Today it is well recognized throughout the United
States that interference with an individual's business is a
compensable tort. Prosser refers to the tort as "intentional
interference with prospective economic advantage."
Torts, §130 at 649 (4th Ed.).

Prosser,

Harper & James calls the

tort, "interference with reasonable economic expectations."
Harper & James, Torts, §6.11 at 510 (1956).

The Proposed

Restatement of Torts 2d, §766(B) defines the tort as follows:
§766(B) Intentional Interference with Pros ective
Contractua Re ation.
Onewhointentionally-and improperly-interferes
with-another's prospective contractual relation is
subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary harm resulting from loss of the benefits of
the relation, whether the interference consists
of:
(a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person
not to enter into or continue their prospective
relation, or
(b) preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the prospective relation.
Regardless of the name given to the tort, the courts
and counnentators generally agree that the elements of the
tort are:
(1) the present or probable future existence of a
contract, business relations or business expectancy
beneficial to the injured person;
(2) knowledge of the contract, relations or ex-
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pectancy on the part of the interferer;
(3) intentional interference which induces or
causes a termination of the contract or foreclosure of the business relations or expectancy;
and,
(4) resultant damages. Expanding Horizons in the
Law of Torts - Tortious Interference, 23 Duke L.
Rev. 341, 343 (1974).
While the Utah Supreme Court appears never to have
directly faced the application of the doctrine of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage,
there are three reasons why the Court should recognize the
tort:

(1) The same policy reasons that call for the pro-

tection of contract call for protection of the right to seek
future contracts; (2) All of the Western States that have
considered the problem have recognized the tort; and, (3)
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that it will recognize
the tort.
There is dictum in two Utah cases that suggest the tort
will be recognized.

The first case is Soter v. Wasatch

Development Corp., 21 Ut.2d 224, 443 P.2d 663 (1968).

The

case involved an allegation of interference with contract by
defendant. The court said:
In order to establish a right to recover on such a
cause of action the plaintiffs would have to show
that the defendants, without justification, by
some wrongful or malicious act, interfered with
the plaintiff's right of contract and that actual
damages resulted. Id. at 664.
The second case was Gammon v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n.,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

Inc., 14 Ut.2d 291, 383 P.2d 402 (1965).

In that case,

plaintiff had a writing which, he had alleged, gave him
exclusive right to transport all the milk certain farmers
produced.

Defendant persuaded the farmers to let him ship

their milk at a lower rate.

The trial court found that the

plaintiff's agreement with the farmers was not an exclusive
contract, but merely provided for payment to plaintiff in
the event that the farmers used his services to deliver milk
and entered a summary judgment on that basis.

The Supreme

Court remanded to determine if defendant had intentionally
interfered with plaintiff's business.

The court ordered the

case submitted tc:
[T]he jury for determination of whether Federated,
in urging its members who had conven:ed to tank
method to use only its transportation services,
did so to further its legitimate business in ~rests
or had unjustifiably persuaded its members not to
use Gammon's services so as to enable ic to ±:ix
minimum prices for milk ... Id. at 405-406.
Five of Utah's neighboring states that have considered
the issue

reco~nize

the rort.

In the case of Buckaloo v.

~::i:-c of
i:-i~E-:::ferc::.:1ce -:. ith conLrc-c: : _ - PLe--:"E.'., c.t spc:.cie-s of
1
t. '-e 1:_r.~,adr~~ 1...:cLt ~f ir-tr.:rfe~er1ce -1. ~~-::.r. ~~J:O:=T,;:::cti\ie

The great V:·c i;:hr of authr-,Yi tv is <,cc the
1

ecc:-io::::lic dG.var.-c:.a.;e.

(ci-::=c:tior. .: - C71ii:-..,~-->

TI.:L.s

while the el_err,ents of the two ac+:ions ctre similar,
the 2x:·
710t

st·~:i:ice

2'

:i.

le,~_.:::.~_:_--

a~~~-]~.~~:__~~ ~C·

based on the

mor~

t~·,.:

.:_.~.3

--

---~--

inclusive wrong

:=i.~_:._-ee...-l'·f'-it
iC·:=-

,Jf

J

is
suit

Id. at 869.
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The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment based on the grounds that there was no contract.
The Supreme Court reversed saying that the existence of a
contract was not a prerequisite for the action.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court said in a case involving a
dispute between-two competing gas companies as-to the quality of pipe used by one of the companies:
[O]ne has the right to carry on and prosecute a
lawful business in which he is engaged without
unlawful molestation or unjustified interference
from any person, and any malicious interference
with such business is an unlawful act and an
actionable wrong. Crystal Gas Co. v. Oklahoma
Natural Gas Co., 529 P.2d 987, 989 (Ok. 1974).

In the case, the plaintiff failed to prove that the statements by the defendant were the proximate cause of the
damages-sustained by the plaintiff.
In Pre-Fit Door, Inc. v. Dor-Ways, Inc., 13-Ariz.App.
438, 477 P.2d 557 (1970), the Arizona Supreme Court said:
The intentional and unjustified third party
interference with valid contractual relations or
business expectancies constitutes an actionable
tort recognized in this State. (citations omitted)
The tort has been crystalized and defined in
Restatement of Torts §766 (followed by a quotation
of the Restatement). Id. at 559.
The actual case dealt with a contract and the facts are
not relevant to the present case.

The Oregon Supreme Court in Luisi v. Bank of Commerce,
449 P.2d 441 (Or. 1969), recognized the tort.

In that case,

Oscar Pollard and Ray Powell were partners in an automobile

-13-
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dealership.

Powell served notice that he wanted to termin-

ate the business.

Pollard agreed to buy him out.

Plaintiff

alleged that Pollard agreed to accept him as an equal partner in return for plaintiff providing the money to buy out
Powell.

Plaintiff claimed that the defendant bank interfered

with·the contract between himself and Pollard:

The court

said that there was no contract between plaintiff and Pollard, but:
We do not mean to indicate that it is necessary,
in all cases, that there actually be a contract in
existence before a third party can be held responsible for interference. A third party can be
held responsible for interference with a business
interest even though the arrangement entered into
does not rise to the dignity of a contract. See, 4
Restatement of Torts §766(b). Id. at 443. The court, however, held that-the plaintiff was limited to
proving the existence of the contract because .he had alleged
interference with

contract~in

his complaint.

In Scymanski v. Dufault, 80 Wash.2d 77, 491 P.2d 1050
(1972), Washington recognized the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage.
The allegations of the Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint sets forth all the elements needed for a prima

~

case of intentional interference with prospective economic
advantage.

Those allegations are further supported by the

affidavits and discovery in the case.

The Defendants have

admitted that the Plaintiffs had a future prospective business relationship with tourists visiting the area and that
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the Defendants intentionally interfered with that rela-

f

tionship.

The Defendants, however, claim that even though

their actions constituted all the elements of a prima facie
case for intentional interference with prospective contract

ed

or economic advantage, that their actions were absolutely
privileged under the First Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States.

The trial court, in agreeing with the

Defendants, erred and the case should be returned to the

n

District Court for a determination of the facts resulting in
the tort and for a determination of whether justification or
privilege exists in light of those facts.

4

d -
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POINT II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT PROVIDE AN ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE TO COMMIT THE COMMON LAW TORT
OF INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE
ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE AND, THEREFORE, THE CASE
SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT SO
THAT THE TRIER OF FACT CAN DETERMINE, AFTER
HEARING ALL OF THE EVIDENCE, WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS' ACTIONS WERE JUSTIFIED, PROPER OR
PRIVILEGED.
A.

This Court should set forth those elements which
Defendants must .establISh to_ _claim a -.First Amendment rivile e and then remand the case to a
jury or a consi eration o t e acts to etermine whether the Defendants' actions were privileged.

It -is elementary Constitutional law that while the
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
guarantees citizens certain of the most important rights
known to man in a free society, there are certain actions
which, although they may involve speech or efforts to influence government action, are not Constitutionally protected-. _ Miller v. California,-: .413 ·u :s ;- 15 (197:3)-; Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Lehman v·;. Shaker Heights,
418 U.S. 298 (1974); Zacchinni v. Scrips-Howard Broadcasting,
433 U.S. 562 (1977); and, Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S.
448 (1976).

The Court has identified at least four cate-

gories of expression:

commercial speech, Valentine v.

Chrestgreen, 316 U.S. 52 (1944); libel, Gertz v. Welch, 418
U.S. 323 (1974); obscenity, Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1973); and, fighting words, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942), which may be directly regulated by the
State without necessarily contravening First Amendment
guarantees.

Also, such acts as kidnapping and the holding
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of hostages for the purposes of influencing the actions of
government are obviously not protected by the Constitution
but actually criminal.
Unlike other areas of intentional torts such as injury
to person or property or defamation, the branch of tort law
dealing with unjustified, intentional interference with a_
prospective business relation has not developed a crystalized
set of definite rules as to the existence or non-existence
of privilege.

See, Proposed Restatement of Torts 2d, §767,

comment (b). Rather the law on this subject has

tradition~

ally been expressed in terms of whether the interference is
improper rather than in terms of whether there is a specific
privilege to act in a particular manner.

The issue in each

case is whether the interference is improper under the
circumstances; whether upon a consideration of the relative
significance of the factors involved, the conduct should be
permitted without liability, despite the effect of harm to
another.

The decision depends upon a judgment and choice of

values in each situation.
Torts 2d, §769 - §773.

See, Proposed Restatement of

None of the previously identifiable

situations, which have been found proper or justifiable,
relate to the kind of activities engaged in by the Respondents in this action.

The trial court in this case held

that even if the Plaintiffs were able to prove the truthfulness of each of the allegations of their complaint at

-17-
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trial, Defendants are entitled to judgment dismissing the
complaint as a matter of law since Defendants' actions were
absolutely privileged by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

To hold the Defendants are

iIIll!lune under the First Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States when called upon to respond for damages caused
by untrue and malicious statements, confers an absolute
privilege, regardless of the tortious nature of the activity.
The decision of the District Court below merely assumed
without any analysis that the Defendants' actions were
themselves an exercise of First Amendment rights.

It is

appropriate for the Court to decide what factors can constitute privileged conduct and then to submit the issue of
whether_ the_Defendants' conduct was privileged under the
particular_fa~tual

situati~n

to the jury under proper

instructions. It is not appropriate for the Court to decide
as a matter of-law what is privileged and whether the
privilege exists in a given case where there are factual
controversies.

Unless it can be said that the First Amend-

ment right of free speech guarantees Defendants an absolute
right to intentionally and maliciously, by use of false and
misleading statements, destroy Plaintiffs' businesses, the
District Court erred in granting Defendants' motion for
summary judgment and should be reversed.

-18-
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y.

d

B.

Missouri v. N.O.W. did not establish a category
of expression absolutely protected by the Constitution and the trial court erred in rel in on
Missouri v. N.0.W. to create an a solute privilege.

The trial court held that under the case of Missouri
v. N.0.W., 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
(1980), the Defendants have an absolute privilege

U.S.

for their actions.

Such a holding means that Defendants'

actions were privileged even though they were intentional
and malicious, and some of the statements made were false
and made with an intent to cause injury to third party
businesses which had no relationship with the political
entity that the Defendants were trying to influence.

The

Court's reliance on Missouri v. N.O.W. for such a broad
privilege is misplaced.

This Court is not-bound by the

holding of Missouri v. N.0.W. and, even if it were, it is
distinguishable, both legally and factually, from the
present

~ase.

Furthermore, the ruling in Missouri v. N.O.W.

did not purport to grant an absolute privilege and the
holding of the District Court in this case goes further than
the Missouri v. N.O.W. court.
The case of Missouri v. N.0.W. and the cases on which
that decision is premised are anti-trust cases.

They are

not cases which involve typical facts involving the tort of
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage
as do the facts in the present case.

As the 8th Circuit
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Court of Appeals pointed out in Missouri v. N.0.W.:
(T]he primary question with which we must deal is
the applicability of the Sherman Act to a politically motivated but economically tooled boycott
participated in and organized by non-competitors
of those who suffer as a result of the boycott.
Missouri v. N.0.W. at 1302.
The trial court and the appellate court in Missouri v.
N.0.W. treated the case as an anti-trust case in determining
whether the Sherman Act was applicable.

Very little effort

was expended by either court in considering the common law
tort.

The consideration that was given to the tort claim was

premised on anti-trust law.

The court in Missouri v. N.O.W.

found that the boycott organized by N.0.W. was privileged
because of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.

In Eastern

Railroads President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), the United States Supreme Court
held that the-Sherman Act does not apply to_activities which
comprise the mere solicitation of government action with
respect to passage and enforcement of laws.

That decision

was affirmed in United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington,
381 U.S. 657 (1965), when the court held that the First
Amendment privilege existed even if the defendant's motive
was to curtail competition.

Both the Noerr and Pennington

cases recognized that the First Amendment privilege was not
absolute.

In California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking

Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), the court held that the
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Noerr-Pennington First Amendment privilege was not absolute
and that it could not be used as a means or pretext for
achieving substantial evils or abusing the administrative
and judicial processes.
The courts, while recognizing the great protection
which must be given to the First Amendment rights, have
never held that those rights are absolute and that a person
has an absolute right to intentionally harm innocent parties
or businesses in the exercise of those First Amendment
rights.

See,

~.

Miller v. California,

413 U.S. 15

(1973); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Hudgens v. NLRB,

424 U.S. 507 (1976); Zacchinni v. Scrips-Howard Broadcasting
~.

433 U.S. 562 (1977); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S.

448 (1976); Garnett Co._, J:nc .. v. DeP.asqual, 443 U.S.: 368n
(1979); and, Gertz v. Welch, 418 -U.S. 323 (1974).

The trial

court's holding that the Defendants' statements and actions
were privileged even though they were false, malicious and
done in an attempt to intentionally harm the Plaintiffs
expanded the protection of the First Amendment rights further
than any decision of the U. S. Supreme Court.

The trial

court's ruling appears to put no limitations on what a party
can do, as long as he claims that his actions are politically motivated.

The ruling would seem to legitimatize the

actions of the nation of Iran in its holding of United

-21-
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States' citizens as hostages in an attempt to influence the
actions of the United States Government. The Defendants'
actions, on a smaller scale, were very similar in that the
Defendants attempted to place in hostage the local businesses,
including the Plaintiffs, in an attempt to influence the
actions of Vernal City and,Uintah County.

The First Amend-

ment rights, though precious, were never intended to

allo~

an individual to intentionally harm a person or his business
on the premise that he was trying to achieve political
changes.
Missouri v. N.O.W. is also factually distinguishable
from the present case.

In that case the plaintiff was a

government entity whose political actions the defendant was
trying_ to in£luence by boycott.

In the present case, the

Plaintiffs are businessmen involved in running .a _motel, cafe
and gift shop, which businesses depend upon the tourist
business for a =Bizeable portion --of their income. The Plaintiffs are not officials of Vernal City or Uintah County and
have no control over the political decisions made by either
of those entities.

The Defendants initiated a secondary

boycott against the Plaintiffs intending to harm the businesses of the Plaintiffs and then claimed their actions were
privileged.

The claim of a First Amendment privilege in

such a factual situation is not warranted.

The Defendants

have many lawful avenues open to them by which they could

-22-
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petition the local government entities to seek desired
changes in the dog pound.

Instead of using those lawful

methods, the Defendants intentionally harmed the Plaintiffs
and other businesses which have no control over the political decisions made.

To allow a First Amendment privilege in

such a factual setting was surely not contemplated by-the
framers of the First Amendment nor has it been recognized by
the courts.
The present case is further distinguishable from the
Missouri case in that in Missouri, the government entity
that the defendants were trying to influence was the State
of Missouri, while the present case involves county and city
governments.

The law recognizes varying degrees of privilege

depending on what level of government is involved.

See,

In Re Airport Car Rental Anti-trust Litigation, 474 F.Supp.
1072 (1979).

(Cf. the distinction between public figures

and private individuals in the defamation cases.) Furthermore,
there is a vast difference between the changes the defendants in each case desired to have made. In the Missouri
case, the defendants were attempting to have the State of
Missouri and other states pass legislation ratifying an
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, while in
the present case the Defendants were attempting to punish
local government officials because of past operations of an
animal control facility.

Grave doubts can be raised whether

the activities engaged in by Defendants constitute exercise
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of First Amendment rights and whether the actions sought to
be extracted by Defendants were even political in nature.
To allow an organization such as the Humane Society of Utah
to cause intentional and malicious injury to businessmen
such as the Plaintiffs, who have no control over political
decisions, in an attempt by that organization and its
directors to force its personal desires upon local political
entities, is wrong. The courts have long recognized that it
is wrong and have developed the coIIUllon law tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage
allowing the plaintiff to recover damages it incurred as a
result of that wrong. The holding by the trial court that
the Defendants' actions were absolutely privileged even
though false, malicious and done with a wilful intent to
harm the Plaintiffs, compounds the wrong the Plaintiffs have
suffered.

The abandoning of the common law tort which would

rectify the wrong done to the Plaintiffs and the finding of
such a broad privilege by the trial court was clearly erroneous and the case should be remanded for trial so that a
jury can hear the facts and determine whether a privilege
exists.
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POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SUMMARILY
DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT WITHOUT
ALLOWING PLAINTIFFS THE OPPORTUNITY TO
PRESENT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL THAT DEFENDANTS'
CAMPAIGN TO DESTROY PLAINTIFFS' BUSINESS
CONSISTED OF FALSE AND MISLEADING STATEMENTS PUBLISHED INTENTIONALLY AND MALICIOUSLY AND WITHOUT LEGAL JUSTIFICATION.
The case is before the Court on appeal from a summary
judgment granted by the trial court to the Defendants.

A

motion for sunnnary judgment should be granted only when the
pleadings, depositions, admissions, other discovery, and the
affidavits show without dispute that the party seeking
sUIIDI1ary judgment is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.
Gillmor v. Carter, 15 Ut.2d 280; 391 P.2d 426 (1964).

The

trial court, in deciding whether to grant a motion for
summary judgment, must consider the pleadings, depositions,
etc., in a light favorable

~o

the party opposing the motion

for summary judgment and all doubts must be resolved in
favor of the opposing party.

Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d

1332 (Ut. 1977); Foster v. Steed, 19 Ut.2d 435; 432 P.2d 60
(1967).

Only if it appears to a certainty that the Plain-

tiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of
facts, even if all the facts alleged by the Plaintiff were
held to be true, should a motion for summary judgment be
granted.

Holbrook v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Ut. 1975);

Hughes v. Housley, 599 P.2d 1250 (Ut. 1979).
The trial court in granting the Defendants' motion for
summary judgment had before it the pleadings, extensive
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discovery, affidavits and prior court rulings, together with
the extensive legal memoranda of the parties.

The Plain-

tiffs' Third Amended Complaint alleged that the Defendants
had maliciously and unlawfully published false and misleading statements for the purpose and with the intent to injure
the Plaintiffs' business.

The allegations of the Plaintiffs'

Third Amended Complaint were supported by the discovery,
affidavits and legal memoranda.

The trial court after

having reviewed the pleadings, affidavits, discovery and the
legal memoranda held that even if the Plaintiffs were able
to prove the truthfulness of each of their allegations at
trial, the Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter
of law because their actions were privileged under the First
Amendment right to petition.

It is the position of the

Plaintiff that there does not exist an absolute First Amendment privilege to the tort of interference with prospective
economic advantage and, therefore, the case should be remanded for trial so that the trier of fact can determine,
after hearing all of the evidence, whether the Defendants'
actions were privileged.

Soter v. Wasatch Development Cor£·•

21 Ut.2d 224, 443 P.2d 663 (1968); In Re Airport Car Rental
Anti-trust Litigation, 474 F.Supp. 1079 (1979); Restatement
of Torts 2d, §767;

Political Boycott Activity and The First

Amendment, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 659 (1978).
The Court's granting of the Defendants' motion for
summary judgment without a trial was error and deprived
Plaintiffs of their right to present the facts to the jury
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for a determination of whether Defendants' actions were
proper, justified or privileged.

Only a determination that

intentionally unlawful, false and malicious statements and
actions have Constitutional protection could justify the
summary judgment.

That such is not a proper rule of law is

clearly set forth in the section identified as Point II
of this brief.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-27-

